How would people spend time if confronted by permanent declines in market work? We identify preferences off exogenous cuts in legislated standard hours that raised employers' overtime costs in Japan around 1990 and Korea in the early 2000s. Using time-diaries from before and after these shocks, we estimate the probability that an individual would have been affected by the reform. Reduced-form estimates show that the direct effect on a newly-constrained worker was a substantial reduction in market time, with the free-up time in Japan reallocated to leisure and personal maintenance, while in Korea the results are mixed, showing some impact on household production. Simulations using GMM estimates of a Stone-Geary utility function defined over time use suggest no effect on household production in either country. Estimation of a household model shows only slight evidence that spouses shared the time gift, nor that one spouse's allocation of non-market time changed when the other spouse's market work was permanently and exogenously reduced.
I. Introduction
Time spent in market work is the second most important human activity in rich countries (see e.g., Burda et al, 2013) after sleep. Nonetheless, it did diminish in the U.S. between 1900 and 1940 (Kniesner, 1976) and dropped sharply from 1950 through 1980 in most of Western Europe (Huberman and Minns, 2007) . Given this secular decrease and continuing pressures for further reductions, both to "spread work" (Nickell, 2008) and to move society away from a rat-race equilibrium (Akerlof, 1976; Landers et al, 1996) , asking what people would do with their extra time if they were confronted with a large decline in market hours remains an important question.
The difficulty in answering this question is that changes in individuals' time allocations arise from the interaction of changes in the technology of the production of Beckerian commodities with consumers' preferences for those commodities. That makes it impossible to identify how workers would respond to a permanent cut in market work, or to infer the general equilibrium effects of that cut on time allocation in an entire population, by looking at historical changes. Over time the technologies do change and can explain some of the changing time allocation (Greenwood et al, 2005) . Those changes might in turn explain the apparent increase in leisure in the U.S. in the last half century that did not accompany any decline in market work (Aguiar and Hurst, 2007) , a change that was mirrored in some European countries (Gimenez-Nadal and Sevilla-Sanz, 2013) . But the changing technologies prevent one from inferring preferences for different kinds of non-market activities.
Various authors have considered how time allocations respond to temporary changes in the time available for non-market and market activities. Thus Hamermesh (2002) demonstrated that even an abrupt, fully-anticipated and temporary increase in available time (resulting from a switch off summer time) is non-neutral, with a disproportionate fraction of the increase consumed as additional personal maintenance activities, mostly sleep. Burda and Hamermesh (2010) showed that a temporary, but presumably unexpected decrease in market work (resulting from cyclical changes in employment) is disproportionately taken up by increased household production.
In related work (Lee et al, 2012) we considered how aggregate patterns of time use changed after shocks to market work time were imposed legislatively; but no study has examined how individual workers' time allocations respond to an exogenous permanent decline in market work, nor has any looked at the effects of such a decline on patterns of time use across household members.
1 None could-there have been very few permanent exogenous shocks to market work; and, in any event, the continuing timediary information required to analyze the impact of these shocks on the distribution of non-market time has rarely been available. A few countries have indirectly imposed changes in hours of work by introducing legislated changes in laws regulating the standard workweek (e.g., France, see Crépon and Kramarz, 2002) or giving union-management negotiators incentives to alter standard hours (e.g.,
Germany, see Hunt, 1999) ; but these changes have been small and have, in any case, not always been permanent.
In an effort to reduce work hours, between 1988 and 1997 Japan shortened the standard work week, resulting in a substantial reduction in market work (Kawaguchi et al, 2008) . Quinquennial Japanese time-diary data are available from 1976, allowing us to examine the impacts of this shock and to account for possible trends in time use that may have been occurring. Korea made a similar change in the early 2000s, and Korean time diaries from 1999 and 2009 enable us to examine time allocation before the legislative change was proposed and after its effects had time to be realized.
The exogeneity of the demand shocks allows us to examine changes in time use in relation to the propensity of an individual to have been affected by the policy change. We use time-diary surveys to measure how someone whose market time became constrained reallocated the time freed up from reduction in paid work, thus measuring the average effect of the legal change on someone who was directly affected. We specify a utility function that allows using the relationships between the propensity to be affected by the law and changes in time allocations to infer the nature of individuals' preferences for 1 Goux et al (2011) examine the impact of the French change in the standard workweek on the labor supply of spouses of workers who were affected by the legislated change. The focus was only on the spouse's hours of market work. Stancanelli and van Soest (2011) study the impact on time allocation of the discrete jump in incentives to retire in France after one's 60 th birthday, an incentive that is permanent and well-known to workers while planning the time paths of their allocations of time. different uses of time. Those estimates in turn allow checking whether the reduced form yields results consistent with the underlying structure.
Because the time-diary surveys were administered to all adults in a household on the same day,
we can use them to analyze how the shocks to one spouse's market work time spill over to affect the time allocation of the other spouse. This allows us to examine household decision-making in a way that has not previously been possible, since we are able to separate changes resulting from changing opportunities from those arising from changes in household technology and household formation.
II. The Shocks and the Data

A. Legislated Changes in Work Hours
Statutory working hours in Japan had historically been set at 48 per week and 8 per day. In The JTUS for 1986 clearly precedes the shock to hours, while the 1996 survey is nearly entirely post-shock. The timing of the surveys does not perfectly bracket the timing of the legislated changes, but it is fairly close. By chance the timing of the KTUS is almost perfect for the purposes of this study: The first survey precedes any possible effects of the cut in demand for market work, and the third takes place after the changes had almost entirely been realized.
The time-diary surveys from Japan and Korea allow respondents to list far too many different activities for purposes of analyzing the impacts of the legislated changes. We need to combine the basic activities into tractable aggregates. We take the fourfold breakdown: Market work (M); household production (H); personal activities (P) and leisure (L), and classify each basic activity in each country into one of these. Market work includes paid employment or self-employment, unpaid employment, job search, commuting and schooling/studying. Household production consists of those activities for which one could find market substitutes (as initially proposed by Reid, 1934 
III. Inferring the Direct Impact of the Imposed Decrease in Market Work
The cut in the standard workweek in Japan and Korea is an imposed shock, the results of which trace out a locus of equilibrium time allocations that depend upon workers' preferences. This understanding underlies our treatment in this Section, in which we first measure the direct effect-on the market work of an individual who was certain to have been affected by the policy-and then infer the structure of the representative affected individual's preferences for allocating time across the other three aggregates of time to simulate the response to a negative shock to M.
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Reduced-Form Estimates of the Effect
Absent longitudinal time-use data covering the periods before and after the demand-induced declines in M, we generate a pair of cross-sections, with the cells based on the demographic characteristics of the time-diary respondents. We use a matching procedure to link observations across cells in the time-use data before the change (1986 in Japan, 1999 in Korea) to observations after the change (1996 in Japan, 2009 . In the Japanese data we use the two sexes, individual years of age and the three education categories (junior high school or less, high school, junior college or more).
We treat the Korean data identically except that we use the twelve available categories of educational attainment. There is a substantial number of empty cells (e.g., in Korea, no young people have zero education); in general, however, the immense size of the underlying samples allows the creation of a larger set of aggregate scores than is usual in studies using this method. 4 In Korea the number of prorated minutes was 19 in both 1999 and 2009. In Japan the total minutes prorated were somewhat greater: 34 in 1986 and 48 in 1996.
5 Trying to infer a particular effect using both reduced-form and formal structural estimation is unusual, but it is not unheard of in the literature on the supply of hours to the market (e.g., Crawford and Meng, 2011) .
For each country in Year B, before the legislated change, we estimate the propensity score for individual i to be affected by the legal change as:
where X is a vector of covariates. 6 These workers are directly affected by the policy in a monotonic way.
Workers who worked 40 hours or less before the change are not directly affected. Those workers who worked longer than the old standard hours are affected by the law in a complex way, as the legal change may have increased or decreased their hours, depending on the sizes of the substitution effect on hours per worker and the scale effect due to the increased marginal cost of labor (see, e.g., Hart, 2004) . We derive the average probability that an individual with characteristics X in Year B was constrained, and assign that value to the age-sex-education cell in Year A, after the legal change. The identifying assumption here is that the individual with characteristics X would have been constrained with the same probability in Year A as in Year B if the law had not changed. Tables 1J and 1K (a tabular notation we use throughout to denote the results for Japan and Korea)
show the averages of the propensity scores across the cells, their standard deviations and a few order statistics. (The cell sizes differ slightly across the days of the week because of slight differences in the number of non-empty cells on each day.) The main point to note on these statistics is that, although the average probability that an individual is constrained by the legal change is not large, the variation in the average propensity across the cells is huge, allowing the possibility of inferring that tightening constraints on hours had substantial effects.
Taking the average propensity scores for each age-sex-education cell using sampling weights, and using the weighted average of changes in time use in the four categories for each cell, we estimate a reduced form relating the change in time use (post-minus pre-shock) to the propensity to be affected.
Considerations of the fixed costs of working on a given day suggest that employers have incentives to concentrate their reductions in hours demanded on one or two days rather than across the week. 7 We thus estimate this simple bivariate equation separately for weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. Simple acquaintance with the labor markets in Japan and Korea leads us to expect that differences in the propensity to be affected by the legislated changes in the standard workweek will have their biggest effects on time use on Saturdays, with smaller effects on Sundays and still smaller effects on weekdays.
Tables 1J and 1K present the estimates of these reduced forms for the two countries. As expected, the effects are largest, and the regression coefficients most significant, for the estimates for Saturdays. In one case (on weekdays in Japan) the impact of a higher propensity to be affected by the change in standard weekly hours on ΔM is actually positive, although statistically insignificant. Except in that case, however, in those cells in which the propensity to be affected by the legislated change rose more the decline in M was significantly larger.
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In Japan (Korea) a ten-percentage-point increase in the probability of being constrained was accompanied by a 37-(60-) minute decrease in minutes of work on Saturday. In Japan this decrease was accompanied by significant increases in all three other aggregates of time use, with the majority of the change represented by additional leisure and only ten percent accounted for by extra home production.
On Sundays the only significant increase (or even change) in Japan in response to the 5-minute decline in market work induced by a ten-percentage-point increase in the probability of being constrained was in L.
On weekdays H decreased significantly while L rose. In Korea the significant and large declines in M (16 minutes, 60 minutes and 17 minutes in response to a ten-percentage-point increase in the propensity to be affected by the legislated drop in standard hours) were accompanied by significant increases in H throughout the week, and by significant increases in L on weekends.
7 There is little research directly measuring fixed daily costs of labor, although a number of studies base the empirical work on this concept (e.g., Cogan, 1981; Hamermesh, 1998) . 8 If we look at the extreme centiles of the distributions of the propensity scores, e.g., the 10 th and 90 th , the results are even stronger. In the former ΔM is close to 0, and there are nearly random changes in the other time-use aggregates. At the 90 th percentile ΔM is very large, with its decline being offset entirely by changes in T and L.
The crucial inference from the estimates in these tables is that the legislated declines in the standard workweek led to cuts in hours of market work that were especially large among workers who would have been affected by the reduction of standard hours. The effect on a hypothetically treated worker is estimated to be huge-if a worker were certain to be constrained, essentially all the hours made subject to the overtime penalty would be eliminated. While in both countries the estimates suggest that such a worker used much of the freed-up time to add hours of leisure or personal care, in Korea there is some evidence that the affected workers did reallocate it in part to household production.
There may have been no technical change in household production (or in the production of commodities that use leisure time as an input) over the decades in question in Japan and Korea. We do not, however, need to make that restrictive assumption. Instead, for our inferences to be correct, we only need to assume that any such technical changes were independent of the demographic characteristics (age, education and gender) that we have used to form the propensity scores. This less restrictive assumption is not testable (we cannot, for example, observe whether the installation of time-saving home machinery differed by demographic group during these periods), but it seems fairly reasonable.
One might be concerned that we have merely shown that the changes in M continued trends in time use in particular demographic groups from before 1986 (1999 in Korea) and preceded trends that continued thereafter. While the absence of earlier data and a subsequent time period in Korea prevents us from examining this question there, we can conduct a placebo test for the validity of this instrument by examining the relationships between the changes in time use in Japan from 1976 to 1986, and from 1996 to 2006, across age-sex-education cells with different propensity scores (in 1976 and 1996 respectively) .
If the idea behind the construction of instrument is valid, there should be no relationship between the changes in market work time over these earlier and later periods and the propensity to be affected by the legislated changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Table 1J . As the table shows, during the decade before the law changed there is actually a positive, but statistically insignificant relationship between ΔM and the propensity score. Moreover, underlying our conclusion that the main impact of the law was on market work time on Saturdays, the double-difference in the parameter estimates is very large and highly significant-what had been a positive relationship between the change in market work and the propensity score in the previous decade became negative during the "experimental" period among those people most likely to have been in the "experimental" group. During the decade after the "experiment" the changes in M in relation to the differences in the probability of being constrained were tiny on weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. The relationship between ΔM and the probability of being constrained by the law held neither in the decade before 1986 nor in the decade after 1996.
B. A Structural Model
The results in the previous sub-section justify using the changes in time use around the time of the legislated cuts to estimate the utility functions describing affected workers' preferences for different uses of time, and to use the estimated preferences to simulate how the gift of time generated by the exogenous decline in market work of a given size might be reallocated across alternative uses. We assume that an agent allocates time according to the following Stone-Geary utility function:
where H + P + L + M ≡ 1440, total minutes in the day. We use this formulation to allow for the possibility of non-homothetic preferences and thus disproportionate responses to the income effect of the extra non-work time. 9 Consider the case in which M is exogenous and fixed at the legal limit, M � .
Consumption C is determined by labor income, and we assume for now that C did not change in either country due to the policy change. With that assumption we assume, absent any other information, that the relative demands for H, P and L were unaffected by changes in incomes with which they are combined in household production. Hence we focus on the allocation of time across H, T, and L in response to the policy changes that reduced M.
The interior solutions are:
The effects of an exogenous unit change in M on H is α ′ = α/(α + β + γ), with β ′ and γ ′ respectively defined analogously. Since we can observe H*, P* and L*, and we know the change in M, we can recover the subsistence levels, assuming one of the three is identically zero. 10 We assume that H = 0-nobody must perform household production. Solving and rearranging yields:
Suppose that we estimate the following equations:
where c P and c L are constants. 11 Then equation (4) allows us to infer the β ′ and γ ′ (and therefore α ′ ) and the subsistence levels. We estimate the model in (4) for the two countries using the cell-based averages of the changes in time use in the four aggregates. Because the change in the constraint bound differently on different days of the week, as the estimates in Tables 1 showed, the parameters are estimated separately for weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. 12 The first, third and fifth columns in Tables 3J and 3K present the weighted least-squares estimates using the means of sampling weights from before and after the policy change. In addition to the standard errors of the estimates, the implied subsistence levels and their changes are shown, along with bootstrapped confidence intervals around them.
10 Unlike in the estimation of Stone-Geary utility functions over goods, where all the parameters are identifiable because of different prices for each good, with the price of unit of time being the individual's wage rate, we must fix one parameter.
11 The assumption of unchanging preferences implies that the constant terms should be zero.
12 Implicitly we are assuming that the agent's utility function is separable across the days of the week. Some indirect evidence for other countries (Ichino and Sanz de Galdeano, 2005) suggests that this may be incorrect. Given the complexities of the estimation presented here, we leave the estimation of an intertemporal aggregator function for future work.
The estimates are fairly satisfactory for Japan. 13 One should note that, although a few of the implied subsistence levels on weekdays and Sundays in Table 3J do not make much sense, the data and estimates for Saturdays for Japan generally imply a gratifyingly constant set of preferences, with the subsistence levels being remarkably unchanged from before the demand shock to afterwards. The leastsquares results suggest that it is reasonable to use the Japanese estimates to simulate how people would reallocate their time in response to an exogenous decline in work time.
The results for Korea, shown in Table 3K , are somewhat less satisfying. Although the parameter estimates are statistically significant for both Saturdays and Sundays (remember, the shock to work-hours on Sundays was larger in Korea than in Japan), they imply that the subsistence levels P and L changed across the years. Since our crucial identifying assumption is that there is an exogenous shock which changes outcomes in the presence of unchanging preferences, the changes in the subsistence levels are disturbing.
Why might the estimates for Korea imply changing subsistence levels? One possibility is that the underlying utility functions for the three types of day are not separable, and that our treatment of them is leading to biased estimates of the sub-utility functions for each type of day. Another possibility arises from the fact that we have treated goods and time as separable, ignoring the underlying household production functions. If changes in the relative prices of goods are differently complementary with H, P and L and thus are not absorbed into the constant terms, estimation limited to time-use data could mistakenly indicate that underlying preferences have changed even when no change has occurred. For example, perhaps the expansion of child-care facilities, a substitute for the household production of child care, altered the constant term in the equations describing H and caused the implied exogenous decrease in H. Without a complete set of goods prices that we believe are uniquely assignable to the time-use 13 We evaluate the estimates at the sample averages of P * and L * (P * and L * ) in 1996 for Japan and 2009 for Korea.
We set M at 480 minutes for weekdays and at 0 for Saturdays and Sundays.
aggregates, we cannot solve this problem. 14 One may also argue that ∆M i * is endogenous, since the actual decline in M may depend, for example, on ΔH. Thus exogenous shifts in fertility might alter time devoted to household production (e.g., fewer children means less time in household education and childcare), leading to a rise in hours of market work.
To address some of these concerns, we use the propensity score as an instrumental variable. The propensity score is, as we showed in Tables 1, significantly and negatively correlated with ∆M i * . The necessary assumption is that the propensity score is uncorrelated with the error term, which will be satisfied because variation in it is identified from the distribution of hours before the policy change. We then use the instrumental variable to estimate the equations jointly by GMM. The GMM estimates are shown in the second, fourth and sixth columns of each table. While a number of the least-squares parameter estimates seemed inconsistent with the underlying theory, the inconsistencies are fewer with these estimates. This improvement underscores the importance of accounting for the potential endogeneity between other uses of time and market work.
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The purpose of this formal estimation was to obtain estimates of structural parameters to simulate the impacts of an imposed shock to market hours on the distribution of affected workers' time use. The size of the shock is arbitrary; but for convenience we base the simulation results on the average changes in M in the two countries on the particular day. Because we saw that the biggest shocks were on Saturday, and because the small shocks on weekdays were not closely related to the propensity scores, our simulations concentrate on presenting changes in time allocation on Saturdays. Table 4 shows the effects of the shocks to M on the other three time-use aggregates on Saturdays.
For each of ΔH, ΔP and ΔL we list the change in minutes arising from the change in behavior with the existing utility function, and then that arising from changes in subsistence levels (which seems 14 With narrower time-use categories it might be possible to make a link between specific expenditures on goods and time, as in Gronau and Hamermesh (2006) , although even there some of the links are quite arbitrary. With the more highly aggregated time-use categories used here the exercise would be even less credible. 15 The remaining negative subsistence levels merely indicate that the particular use of time is a luxury activity. Given the relatively high level of market work time before the reforms, this result is not surprising.
inconsistent with an unchanging set of preferences). For Japan the estimates do imply the required constant preferences-almost none of the simulated changes arise because underlying subsistence levels change. This is particularly true with the GMM estimates-again showing the need to account for endogeneity. Nearly 2/3 of the decline in M results in an increase in L, with most of the rest of the decline leading to an increase in P. Almost none of the decline in M causes an increase in H. In Korea the results are less encouraging-much of the decline in M is simulated to have occurred through changes in preferences. Nonetheless, the simulations do show that 2/3 of the time freed up by the drop in M are using in increased personal time, with most of the rest spent as increased leisure (and almost none in extra household production because of the change in the estimated subsistence level).
C. Accounting for Consumption
The theoretical model in Sub-section B includes consumption spending along with the time uses H, P and L in a system representing the production of commodities in the household. Because the timeuse surveys did not contain information on spending, in our estimation we implicitly assumed throughout that choices about the use of time are separable from goods spending. This is not likely to be the case; but whether neglecting spending matters for purposes of evaluating the impact of the time gift on non-market time use is an empirical issue.
To examine this question further we obtained data from consumer expenditure surveys conducted at or near the times when the relevant time-use surveys were conducted. For Japan we use the National We then impute these spending totals to each adult in the household to measure each person's C.
For Korea we use each adult's age, sex and educational attainment and the estimates of the equations describing the probability of being constrained that we obtained in Sub-section A to estimate C in each cell for 1999 and then 2009 (with C measured in thousands of 1999 Korean won). We then match changes in these flows of consumption spending to the changes in the time-use categories in each cell across the two years. The Japanese consumer expenditure surveys do not contain information on the respondents' educational attainment. We therefore use age, sex and location (prefecture) to re-estimate the propensity scores for Japan from the JTUS and use the same variables to estimate average consumption per adult equivalent (with C measured in yen at 2010 prices). For each age-sex-location cell we match the average C in 1984 to the averages of M, H, P and L for 1986, and similarly for C in 1994
and time use in 1996. We then can examine changes in C and the time-use categories across the two sets of years.
As a first step we estimate the reduced-form relationships between ΔC and the propensity score across the cells to examine whether and by how much spending changed differentially depending upon the likelihood that the constraint on hours affected the individual. For Japan the estimated impact on C of a one standard-deviation increase in the propensity score is -¥5,088; the analogous parameter estimate for Korea is +₩45,952. (One standard deviation of the propensity score is 0.081 for Japan and 0.103 for Korea.)
While the changes in C coincident with the natural experiment on work hours are not small, the crucial question is the extent to which the impacts on consumption can be treated independently from the impacts on non-market time, and thus whether expanding the structural model to include C alters our inferences about the underlying utility parameters or their implications for the impacts of the change in M.
We thus estimate expanded Stone-Geary models for both countries to examine whether the absence of expenditure information might have biased the inferences in Sub-section B. Appendix Tables BJ and BK dates differ by only two years and that we hope that spending patterns by age-sex-prefecture did not change greatly between the dates of the expenditure and time-use surveys.
contain the estimates of these models. The estimated response parameters on C are statistically significant in the GMM estimates; but while both the estimated subsistence levels and response parameters on H, P and L change, these changes are not qualitatively important. Even accounting for (imputed) goods spending, the inference from the structural model remains that in both countries the time freed up from market work is reallocated toward personal time or leisure, and not toward increased household production. Our results are robust to the inclusion of goods expenditures.
IV. Family Effects
Throughout we have treated each person as an individual, ignoring any of the ways in which the legislated change might affect others in the family of a newly-constrained worker. Such an effect might occur, for example, if the time gift to the worker allows him (her) to substitute for his (her) spouse's time in household production, so that both spouses share the extra leisure that is made possible. As another example, the reduction in the market time of the constrained spouse may be fully offset by an increase in market work by the other spouse .
Examining the impact of an exogenous shock to work hours allows us to study household bargaining in ways that have previously not been possible. There are large theoretical and empirical literatures on the underlying structure of preferences and power that determine the allocation of a couple's time (e.g., Becker, 1991; McElroy and Horney, 1981; Bourgignon and Chiappori, 1991) . There is also substantial empirical research on how spouses' bargaining power and resources, usually as measured by their wage rates, affect the distribution of time in the household (e.g., Friedberg and Webb, 2006; Kimmel and Connelly, 2007) . All of the empirical research, however, has had to rely on cross-section differences in proxies for bargaining power to infer the nature of intra-household decision-making about time allocation. Responses to the exogenous shock to one spouse's market time that is provided by the legislated changes in Japan and Korea allow us to identify how a change in resources of one spouse is propagated through the household's decisions about both spouses' time use, and thus to infer the nature of decision-making within the household more carefully than has heretofore been possible.
We follow the approach in Section III, but now focus on married couples that were observationally identical at times B and A. 17 Even with the large samples in the time-use surveys we cannot use single years of age, as we did before. Instead, we define cells as consisting of a husband (h) in five-year age ranges (20-24, …, 60-64) and one of 3 levels of educational attainment in Japan (less than high school, high school, at least some college) and seven levels in Korea (ranging from fewer than eight years, to an advanced degree) and a wife (w) in another one of these 27 (63) demographic categories in Japan (Korea). These aggregations yield the possibility of 729 (3969) Table 5 presents these reduced-form estimates for both countries, separately for weekdays, Saturdays and Sundays. For Japan all of the own-probability effects are statistically significant, but those for husbands are incorrectly signed on weekdays and Sunday. Since we showed before that the legislation had little effect in Japan except on Saturdays, these results are either statistical anomalies or 17 We ignore cohabiting couples, since we have no information and them and, in any event, other evidence suggests that they represent only about one percent of all couples in Japan (see Atoh, 2001 ) and Korea (Lee, 2008) .
show that married Japanese reacted differently from unmarried people. For both husbands and wives on Saturdays in Japan the effects are negative and statistically significantly different from zero. If one extrapolates far outside the support of p h and p w , the estimates are larger than the 480-minute decline that would be consistent with the elimination of Saturday work. In Korea the own-probability effects on Saturdays mirror those in Japan, are statistically significantly non-zero but are not different from the 240 minute-decline that was implied by the legislated change. On other days they are not statistically significant. Overall, and unsurprisingly, these results generally mirror those in Tables 1.
The main purpose of this section is to examine spousal interactions in the allocation of nonmarket time. Before doing that, we first consider how the greater likelihood of a constraint on one spouse's market work affects the market work time of the other; thus we examine the cross-effects of, e.g., a constraint on the husband's work hours on the wife's M in Table 5 . 18 First, note that in the Japanese samples on weekdays and Sundays we reject the hypothesis that one spouse's market work is independent of constraints on the other's; and in Korea on Sundays this hypothesis is also rejected. In Japan the estimated cross-effects are as likely to have an unexpected negative effect as not. In Korea, none of the cross-effects is significant, but all but one are positive and have t-statistics greater than one. Overall, these results provide some weak evidence suggesting that constraints on one spouse's market work time alter that of the other spouse.
The finding that spouses' work times may not be independent of each other in these data justifies going further to examine how a change in one spouse's market time that results from a changing demandside constraint affects the other spouse's non-market time. To do so we estimate equations like those representing the structural model in Section III:
∆L ji * = γ hj ∆M hi * + γ wj ∆M wi * + v Lji , where j = h (husband) or w (wife), and a subscript i represents a family. These are not fully structural estimates-we do not specify a family utility model, as that would require specifying both a general utility function for the typical household and some household production function. Rather, this system allows us to estimate for each spouse the impact of his/her own and his/her spouse's exogenous change in market work on the distribution of non-market time across the three aggregates. By construction α hj + β hj + γ hj = −1 , and α wj + β wj + γ wj = 0 for the husband's non-market time (j = h), and analogously for the wife's. Thus while as in Section III only two of the three equations in each triad are independent, for convenience of exposition we present estimates of all three of these equations.
As in Section III there may be issues of endogeneity of the ΔM* in these systems. Accordingly, we estimate them by GMM, using as instruments for the ΔM* the two propensity scores for each husband-wife cell. We present the estimates in Tables 6. The own-effects mirror those estimated (over larger underlying samples) in the previous section. In Japan, where, as before, the only statistical significance is on Saturdays, the largest effects of a tighter constraint on market hours is on leisure time;
in Korea, where the own-effects are statistically significant only on Saturdays, as in the previous section these reduced-form estimates show some evidence that exogenous decrease in market time increases the directly affected spouse's time devoted to home production.
The major focus of these estimates is on the cross-effects. While we found some evidence that an exogenous change in one spouse's market work altered the other's market work time, here we examine whether there is any evidence that such changes occurred differentially across the three aggregates of non-market time. The results make it quite clear that there is only slight indication of this: Except on Saturdays, for which we expect the biggest effect, in neither country is any of the three hypotheses that both cross-effects equal zero rejected. The only consistent result across the two economies on Saturdays is that an increase in husband's work time decreases the wife's personal time and increases her leisure time. Neither of these effects is very large, however. Implicitly, when confronted with a decline in one's spouse's market work time, one's non-market time allocation does not change much.
Within the range of the impacts of the legislated changes that we examine here, spouses' nonmarket time use appears to be independent-a gift of time to one spouse does not alter the other spouse's allocation of time among household production, personal maintenance and leisure. This result seems quite inconsistent with the myriad studies that reject pooling of income in households and in favor of a collective model. 19 Why might this be? We offer two explanations, and, no doubt, there are others. First, even with a household utility function that assigns weights (measures of power) to each spouse's utility, if household production is Cobb-Douglas one spouse's non-market time use will be independent of the other's. Thus if we do not assume that spouses' time spent in household production is perfectly substitutable, the results here are reasonable. A second possibility is that the transactions costs of sharing an exogenous change in one spouse's time exceed those of sharing an exogenous change in one spouse's income. If that is true, then it might not pay a couple to renegotiate their allocations of time. That would be especially likely if the costs were lumpy and the changes implied here are too small to overcome this non-convexity.
V. Conclusions and Implications
It is impossible to use historical information on time use to infer how people would react to freedom from work: Any long-term change in time-use patterns is determined endogenously through the changing incentives produced by changing household technology and changing returns to market work.
To circumvent this simultaneity we have relied upon the sudden and sharp changes in labor demand generated by discrete and permanent legislated cuts in the standard workweek that gave employers a strong incentive to shorten hours per worker. Using time-diary data for Japan and Korea from before and after the legislation, we first show that time spent in market work by those likely to have been directly affected by the legislation diminished sharply immediately following the legislation's effective date. In Japan those likely to have been affected by the legislation used the extra time to increase leisure activities, while similarly affected Koreans may have used it partly to increase household production. A structural utility model yields parameter estimates that we use in simulations to infer how a shock to market work 19 Lee (2007) provides evidence for the rejection of the hypothesis that Korean couples pool income.
would be spent. For Japan the results of simulations match those of the non-structural approach, suggesting further that we have identified the behavior of individuals choosing (under a demand constraint) how to allocate their time. The match of the two approaches in Korea is less satisfactory, with simulations of the structural method yielding the same results as in Japan.
By affecting the market work of one spouse (typically the husband) more than the other, the legislated changes enable us to infer how an exogenous shock to one spouse's bargaining ability affects how both spouses allocate time, and thus what preferences look like within a couple. We find some evidence that an exogenous reduction in one spouse's market work time leads the other spouse to increase his/her market work time, as is fairly standard in the literature that distinguishes only between market and non-market time. We also find, however, that the mix of a spouse's allocation of time among alternative uses of non-market time is independent of exogenous changes in the other spouse's market work. While this suggests that, unlike monetary resources, couples may not pool time resources, we stress that this is the first bit of evidence to go beyond the market-non-market distinction in examining the impact of exogenous shocks to household bargaining, and as such must be viewed as inherently quite preliminary.
Assuming that technical change in the intermediate future will reduce the demand for time inputs into household production, as it has over the past century, our results suggest that it is unlikely that people will spend more time in those activities. They suggest instead that at current margins additional personal time and leisure yield greater utility than additional time spent in household production, so that those changes in technology would instead probably result in expansions along those margins. 20 This seems especially likely given that the two natural experiments that we have studied began in environments in which market work time exceeded the typical amount observed in rich Western economies that presumably have already moved down the marginal productivity curve for such activities.
The results shed light on a number of related issues that have been studied by labor and other economists. For example, a large literature (beginning with Ruhm, 2000) has considered whether health improves in recessions, with the argument being that work is stressful and that time away from work allows people to invest in health. Our results suggest that an enforced long-run reduction in market work does not lead to substitutes that may be equally stressful, but instead to activities that might be stressreducing and perhaps health-improving.
The conjunction of exogenous demand-induced declines in market work time and the time-diary surveys provided a nearly perfect opportunity to measure how individuals and households' allocations across different types of non-market time would react to a permanent and exogenous decline in market time. There are and will be increasing numbers of other such opportunities, especially with the worldwide growth in the availability of time-diary surveys and the increasing attention to using exogenously imposed changes to identify behavioral responses on one side of a market. We have identified these responses in two economies; but these changes should allow not only the measurement of these effects in other economies with different institutions, but also the development of models that allow a closer focus on the technology of household production, something inherently impossible with the data available here. Cross effects = 0 3.02 2.63 0.42 *Notes: The test for cross effects jointly equaling zero is distributed X 2 (2) (with a 10% significance level of 4.60). The propensity score for the probability of being affected by the reduction of standard hours is used as an instrument here and in Table 6K . 
